The upcoming visit of President Gabriel Buric to China has brought our relations with our key trading and strategic partners, the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, back to the forefront. But the wide range of international relations of a country like Chile, with its diversity of national interests and free trade agreements with many countries and blocs around the world, is not exhausted by the two large countries. Little is said about the three other medium-sized powers that permanently make up the UN Security Council. They are medium-sized nuclear powers and are of paramount importance to Chile, especially two of them that are neighbours, such as France in Polynesia and the United Kingdom in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica. With these two countries, in addition to their geographical proximity, we have important trade exchanges, but they are not as decisive or as large as those we have with China or the United States; However, we also have great exchanges and interests with both. Strategic value.
The three middle powers that constitute the Security Council as permanent members, namely the United Kingdom, France and Russia, maintain their historical global aspirations, although in reality they are merely regional powers, capable of greatly influencing the region in which they are located. But it lacks the economic means and military operational reach to have a suitable and lasting global impact.
On this occasion, we will focus on analyzing the situation of the United Kingdom and the type of relationship we should seek with the British. It is a relationship that has been going on for 200 years, and its intensity and breadth has varied over time, as Great Britain’s place in the world has changed.
As a result of the recent visit of the UK Foreign Secretary to Chile in May 2023, the two countries issued a joint statement (https://www.minrel.gob.cl/minrel/site/docs/20230522/20230522183447/declaracion_conjunta_chile_y_el_reino_unido_vf_220523_vf.pdf) which seems to me to adequately reflect the state of the relationships. A trade relationship that revolves around 600 million US dollars in annual exchange of both imports and exports (https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/4433483/ICE_II_2023.pdf/9a6e1e0b-f32e-1681-6816-2fe981ae1a5c?t=1692729806873), where each one exports products that are good and competitive. It is a balanced, open and transparent relationship, but it is limited to the productive and economic reality of each, and everything indicates that, despite the efforts of the Chilean-British Chamber and bilateral trade agreements, it will remain within the above-mentioned scope. Because there are realities for each person that limit or put a ceiling on how big a relationship can get.
What the joint statement clearly sets out to do is highlight the interest of Chileans in pursuing postgraduate studies at prestigious universities in the UK, something that even many members of the Broad Front elite did in their younger years. It also recognizes deep maritime ties and strategic interests in national defence, which the Navy seeks to maintain despite the budget constraints and problems that Argentina imposes on both.
Up to this point the relationship can be summarized as what is appropriate and proportionate to what both countries are, with commercial relations that reflect each other’s economic potential, and with strengths or attractions that provide support beyond commercial, such as naval and maritime interests. The elite receive their education at British universities.
From now on, commercial matters take care of themselves, as exports and imports have commercial value and logic, and the same applies to interest in studying there, which will continue as UK universities continue to achieve good global rankings for excellence. What does not work with the same logic are maritime relations, which are long-term strategic relationships in which the navies involved invest time and talent, and form direct institutional and personal ties. They have managed to survive over time, even though our State Department supports Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands and interferes in anything relating to our neighbours. It is necessary to remember that Great Britain was also a strategic ally of Argentina and a supplier of naval platforms, until the South Atlantic conflict in 1982.
Historically, the UK has been the main supplier of Chile’s offshore platforms, including support in matters of training, doctrine, training and crew training. We will see whether Great Britain is able to maintain this key role as a strategic ally when the Chilean Navy fully enters into the process of modernizing its fleet through the country’s ongoing National Naval Construction Plan, something that has recently begun aimed at replenishing auxiliary units, but which it must It was immediately decided which course to follow when decisions had to be made regarding frigates, missiles and submarines.
The British know they have an advantage with the Type 140 frigate (the Royal Navy’s Type 31 export model based on successful Danish designs), but there will certainly be competition on the way because we are talking about meeting a strategic need that involves many things. resources. The option of refitting squadron ships with used units simply no longer exists, as the needs for frigate-type ships in today’s world have extended the useful life of ships currently in service. Chile needs a squadron of at least 8 frigates and a force of 4 submarines to maintain adequate deterrence, to have security and strategic influence that contributes to the foreign policy of the Republic, and to have the capacity to defend Chile’s national interests and sovereignty, wherever located. It is time to understand that the Navy will have to replenish its units sooner rather than later, and the UK-designed ships are clearly adapting to the needs of the complex seas of Chile, southern waters and the Pacific. The ocean in which we operate is something we have known since Lord Cochrane took command of the National Squadron, more than 200 years ago.
We have to be smart to design the alliance strategy and linkage between professional navies. We know that we need to start revamping the basic means of division capable of achieving the deterrent effect that we need, and in that sense, our Department of Defense must come together with the Department of State to consider the interests and objectives that arise from this. An inevitable reality. On the other hand, the State Department must understand that an objective and realistic analysis of our strategic needs must overcome any idealistic Latin American aspiration that does not adhere to the reality of facts and data.
The necessary renewal of the national team requires having as many possibilities open as possible to be able to negotiate the option that best suits Chile’s interests, so think in advance or eventually exclude the option of choosing the British model, based on the criteria that the neighborhood policy may not necessarily contribute to the national strategic interest. , which must be met by the most efficient and effective solution the Navy can obtain to ensure its mission is accomplished.
It must be clear that without a deep strategic component, specifically in the maritime and maritime fields, the relationship with the United Kingdom will lose its strength and will remain merely a commercial relationship provided by the productive capabilities of both countries, and embellished by the interests of both countries. The elite educate themselves there and travel to London which, despite Brexit, remains one of the world’s most important entertainment capitals. For our part, if this happens, we will have to solve the complex problem of how to provide security and protection for Chile’s permanent maritime interests without relying on our traditional suppliers for these matters.
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